Cuba 1933 a 1934

http://hdl.handle.net/2027/umn.31951t00248510a?urlappend=%3Bseq=582

The Ambassador in Cuba (Welles) to the Secretary of State
Habana, October 23,1933-^ p. m.
[Received 6: 35 p. m.]
390. The Student Directorate yesterday passed a resolution with
only three opposing votes declaring that Grau San Martin must deter-
mine within a period of 24 hours from the delivery this ultimatum
whether he will undertake to govern the country as President or
whether he will continue to be subservient to Batista. I am informed
that the ultimatum will be delivered this afternoon.
The issue has been raised by the continued refusal of Batista to per-
mit Grau San Martin to remove Guiteras, the Secretary of Goberna-
cion, and by his refusal to permit the students to remove Captain

Franco, present Chief of Police of Habana. As already reported there
are many further causes of disagreement between the students and
Batista.
On Saturday the A.B.C. Radical, the largest of the secret organiza-
tions supporting the government, formally announced its withdrawal
of such support and made overtures to the A.B.C. of which it originally
formed a part for reincorporation in that party.
A significant indication of present conditions is the fact that the
government on Saturday issued a regulation prohibiting all radio
stations from permitting addresses to be broadcast in opposition to the
government. In view of this regulation, at most of the theatres in
Habana Saturday night and yesterday members of the A.B.C, sur-
rounded by armed bodyguards, forced themselves upon the stages
of the theatres and made addresses in which they attacked the govern-
ment violently. In every instance the audiences received them with
tremendous applause.
In view of the crisis with which he is now confronted within the
government, Grau San Martin has made no progress in his negotiations
with the opposition sectors.


http://hdl.handle.net/2027/umn.31951t00248510a?urlappend=%3Bseq=584

The Ambassador in Cuba (Welles) to the Secretary of State
Habana, October 24,1933—11 a. m.
[Received 12: 35 p. m.]
392. As a result of the resolution passed by the directors of the
A.B.C. Kadical withdrawing their support from the government the
group has broken up into two parts—one, a small fraction headed by
Oscar de la Torre has remained with the government; the other, con-
taining approximately 90% of the members, has organized as a politi-
cal party and has come out in violent opposition. This latter group
published this morning an inflammatory attack on Grau San Martin
charging that his government was a worse dictatorship than that of
Machado; claiming that he was plunging the country into anarchy;
insisting that friendly relations with the United States were impera-
tive for Cuba; and that a complete change of government was neces-
sary immediately. This majority group had possession of most of
the arms and ammunition distributed to the A.B.C. Radical by Batista
in the early days after the mutiny. Although ordered by the gov-
ernment to turn back these arms to the Army some time ago they have
retained possession of them and have now secretly conveyed them to
the members of the A.B.C. itself. Fearing reprisals of this action
four of the leading members of the opposition wing fled last night
by air to Miami.
The speeches in the theaters attacking the government continued
last night notwithstanding the efforts of the military to prevent them.
Welles



http://hdl.handle.net/2027/umn.31951t00248510a?urlappend=%3Bseq=601

Habana, November 6, 1933—1 p. m.
[Received 2: 50 p. m.]
431. Personal for the Under Secretary. Referring to our telephone
conversation this morning, the possibilities of a momentary change in
the situation are such that it is impossible to foresee with any assur-
ance what line the developments may take. General conditions are
more precarious than they have been at any moment during the last
2 months. The possibilities are as follows:
(a)—An immediate coup d'etat against Grau by Batista which if
successful will result in the formation of a center government headed
by Gomez or a military dictatorship;
(6)—Outbreak of revolution in Oriente and Camaguey Provinces;
(c)—General strike tomorrow instigated by the Communist organ-
ization;
(d)—Displacement of Batista through violence by elements in the
Army upon whom Guiteras the present Secretary of Gobernacion is
working;
(e)—Reorganization of the government under Grau bringing into
the Cabinet new elements probably of Communist tendencies which
could only result in repeated revolutionary attempts against it.
Under these circumstances I cannot help but feel, much as I would
prefer accompanying the Secretary to Montevideo, that a change in
the Embassy at this moment will be prejudicial to our own interests.
The personal contacts and relationships that I have formed during
the past 6 months are necessarily of value in a critical moment like
this and it is because of this that I believe I should not leave Habana
until after a solution of one kind or another has been found.
Welles



http://hdl.handle.net/2027/umn.31951t00248510a?urlappend=%3Bseq=603

837.00/4353 : Telegram
The Ambassador in Cuba (Welles) to the Secretary of State
Habana, November 9, 1933—10 a. m.
[Received 11: 35 a. m.]
441. Dr. Guiteras, Secretary of the Interior and War, has just stated
to my contact with him that it is intended in the course of the day
to hold summary courts martial and execute immediately all soldiers
or police who joined the opposition movement and who have been
captured. I fear that the opportunity will be taken on some pretext to
execute at the same time some of the officers who have been imprisoned
since the National Hotel incident. I am advising the Spanish Am-
bassador of these facts in order that he may, as Dean of the Diplo-
matic Corps, make such representations as may be possible in the
matter on the grounds of humanity.
Welles